Introduction
qualifications. They are educated for this profession, and specially in all that serves as basis for loyalty to country." 10 But as Chamberlain demonstrated, some of the volunteer officers and "political generals" had significant capacity for combat leadership. Where did it come from? And how did they learn to embrace it?
Purpose
This essay analyzes Joshua L. Chamberlain's upbringing and Civil War experience from a military leadership perspective. In so doing, it provides background and context for the leadership case study in FM 6-22 so that students in the profession or arms can put the "how"
behind the "what" of Chamberlain's success as a small-unit leader. This does two important things. First, it broadens Chamberlain's applicability to a wider audience. Although the case study appears in an Army field manual, Chamberlain's life in general and his experience as an infantry commander can be a source of guidance for officers across the services and through all levels of war (tactical, operational, and strategic). Second, it personalizes his success. By putting
Chamberlain's actions on Little Round Top and conduct at Appomattox on a pedestal, it becomes difficult to emulate his leadership character. Few officers will find themselves in situations such as those. Examining a broader scope of Chamberlain's experience in leadership situations makes it easier for students to relate. It also demonstrates that leadership is not inherently innate. Chamberlain worked hard to improve his qualities, and he offers a model for leaders seeking to improve themselves.
Chamberlain's success as a regimental, brigade, and division commander in the Civil
War was not a product of his aura as a "great man." It was a factor of three tangible and measurable things: his personality, interactions with role models and peers as a child and young adult (his parents, teachers, and friends), the skills he developed and honed in order to succeed at Bowdoin as a student and professor, and the influence of his peers and superior officers in the Fifth Corps, Army of the Potomac. This essay will analyze Chamberlain's personality traits, with a focus on those that fed into his capacity as a combat leader. It will then tie these traits and behavioral motivations to specific manifestations in action and decision throughout his life. Next, it provides an overview of his childhood experiences and time at institutions of higher learning.
Influential people in these stages of his life imparted on him a tireless work ethic, a unique approach to learning, and senses of loyalty and integrity. Hard work and "knowing how to learn" accelerated his grasp of military command, both on and off the battlefield. Loyalty and integrity rounded out his reputation as a solid commander, because it drove him to care for his personnel and stay out of politics within the Army of the Potomac. Lastly, this essay describes
Chamberlain's interactions with the other officers in the Army of Potomac to show that his talent for observation, study, and internalization allowed him to assess the other leaders in the Union Army's "spit and polish" corps. Using his skills for deep understanding through observation and analysis, he evaluated good and bad officers alike and shaped his leadership philosophy around the most effective examples.
Chamberlain's Personality
Chamberlain's depiction in The Killer Angels and his actions at Appomattox (described briefly in FM 6-22) portray him as a highly sympathetic and humble leader. In The Killer Angels, one of the strongest vignettes is his handling of the mutineers from the Second Maine Regiment.
Having been duped by a Maine recruiter into signing three-year enlistments while the rest of the regiment had only signed for two years, about 150 men were arrested and put under guard for failing to obey orders and perform duties. Receiving these men as a newly promoted regimental commander shortly before Gettysburg, Chamberlain leveled with the men, hoping to diffuse the situation by "treating them like soldiers," not criminals. He also promised to address their concerns with Governor Washburn of Maine. 11 However, Chamberlain, like most people, was a mixture of somewhat competing personality traits and motivations. He was sympathetic and empathetic as this vignette shows;
but he was also labeled a strict disciplinarian. 12 Likewise, he was humble, even bashful at times, arguably stemming from his speech impediment as a child. But when examining his personal correspondence and memoirs, it is difficult to ignore his ambition and sense of entitlement to occupy positions of esteem and prestige. For example, after mustering out of the Union
Volunteers as a Brigadier General and losing his title as Brevet Major General (earned for actions at Quaker Road), he wrote a letter to Senator Lot Morrill lobbying for a permanent commission to that rank, saying that "Others have been appointed to every grade, whose military record I am not afraid to have brought into comparison with my own." 13 This dichotomy between humility and ambition was just one example of Chamberlain's competing personality traits. In the struggle to maintain humility and appear humble to his peers and subordinates, he gained respect. Because of his drive to achieve success and appear successful to others, he worked harder than most. Both of these were essential to his success with the 20th Maine. The following paragraphs summarize a variety of personality traits and motivations that enabled Chamberlain to succeed in combat leadership. These include "sensation-seeking," ambitious, empathetic, disciplined (both self-disciplined and "strict but fair" with others), deliberate in thought, courageous (both under fire and for protection of integrity), humble, and patriotic.
Many of Chamberlain's post-war writings lead readers to believe that patriotism was the reason he volunteered for the Union. This was, no doubt, a large part of the equation. According to Chamberlain, "The flag of the nation had been insulted. The honor and authority of the Union had been assaulted in open and bitter war. The north was at last awake to the intent and the magnitude of the Rebellion…" 14 In a letter to Samuel Abbott in 1911, he summed up his views on why the North fought:
…We were fighting for our Country, with all that this involves,-not only for the defence of its institutions, but for the realization of its vital principles and declared ideals. The crisis marked not merely an incident of time, but a momentum of force in the nation's life. The fight to preserve it from destruction has a historical, if not moral, value which should not be lost sight of. I am not in sympathy with any movement or proposition which would deny, obscure or ignore that fact.
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But Chamberlain was also an adventure-seeker and romantic. After graduating Bowdoin,
Chamberlain attended a theological seminary in Maine, but he soon realized that a subsequent career as a minister was not going to fully satisfy his "sensation-seeking" personality. He wrote that instead of languishing in a parish performing sermons day in and day out, he would prefer instead to go to some "heathen place" as a missionary. 16 The same adventure-seeking motivation held true for his military service. As Pullen wrote, "To Chamberlain, the war would act as an adventure." 17 This remained true even after the war; having been offered a commission as a Colonel in the regular army, Chamberlain turned it down, writing that "Soldiering in a time of peace is almost as much against my grain as being a peace man in time of war." 18 Granted, his Petersburg wound greatly diminished his capacity to lead operations in the field. But, in his own words, the need for a high-paced, high risk lifestyle in or outside of the military was his nature.
Patriotism was an important part of Chamberlain's leadership character, but it might have been incomplete were it not for his "sensation-seeking" personality as well. 19 The preponderance of Chamberlain writers tend to focus on Chamberlain's sympathetic and empathetic nature. There were countless manifestations of this throughout his life. His actions during the first night at Fredericksburg, Virginia were a great example. As the Twentieth Warren. 24 And, as Appomattox demonstrated, he also sympathized with the enemy: "At the same time, no one must doubt the heartiness and wholeness with which I recognize the manhood, the brotherhood, and the deep unity of a common faith with our own, on the part of those against whom we had to carry our contention to the triumphant end."
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But as Wallace points out, Chamberlain could wield the stick as well. In discipline, he was strict but fair. 26 In Chamberlain's own words, "discipline was the soul of armies…taken in the long run, and in all vicissitudes, an army is effective in proportion to its discipline." 27 After the war, having seen three years of combat, he realized that discipline served as a source of fighting spirit when the novelties of patriotism and camaraderie wore off under the tide of bloody conflict. As Chamberlain said, "there seemed some slackening of the old nerve and verve; and service was sustained more from the habit of obedience and instinct of duty, than with the sympathetic intuition which inspires men to exceed the literal of orders or of obligations." 28 There is strong evidence to support Wallace's claim that Chamberlain was a disciplinarian, and that he put his views on discipline into practice. Gettysburg, he wrote to the adjutant recommending that these men be removed under provost guard and brought to trial. 32 There was also the incident of an inadvertent discharge during the march back to Washington after Appomattox, which mortally wounded a nearby officer.
Chamberlain even admitted that it might have been an "accident," but he doled out punishment anyway. 33 These examples do not detract from Chamberlain's sympathetic hand or father-like persona. What they show is that an effective balance of discipline and sympathy is a requisite for effective command.
Chamberlain held himself to high standards, knowing that setting the example of selfdiscipline was crucial for expecting discipline in others. He wrote that while yielding to none in my appreciation of the honor due to 'the man behind the musket,' that the military efficiency of such is largely affected by the instruction, discipline, and influence of those in authority and responsibility over them, and their success and fame largely due to the manner in which they are 'handled. I am by no means sure but that injustice must be taken by a military officer as a necessary part of his risks, of the conditions and chances of his service, to be suffered in the same way as wounds and sicknesses, in patience and humility. But when one feels that his honor and the truth itself are impugned, then that larger personality is concerned wherein one belongs to others and his worth is somehow theirs. Then he does not satisfy himself with regret,-that strange complex feeling that something is right which is now impossible,-and even the truth made known becomes a consolation.
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In summary, Chamberlain had a well-rounded set of personality traits and behavioral motivations that were conducive for effective leadership. These consisted of a balance between empathy and discipline, humility and ambition, a sense of adventure, patriotism and courage.
Next, this paper examines external influences prior to Chamberlain's entry into military service to see how they interacted with and affected his personality with a focus on leadership philosophy.
External Influences Prior to Military Service
From childhood through his commission, Chamberlain learned a set of lessons that served him well during the Civil War. In general, Chamberlain was exposed to a mixture of Calvinist, Puritan, Democratic, Pilgrim, and Huguenot ideals as a child. As he later wrote, this was "good for the conscience and constitution," and it imparted the strong work ethic and selfdiscipline previously discussed. 52 Chamberlain had notable influences from his father and
William Hyde, a teacher at the Whiting Military School, who both taught him lessons important for his military career.
Chamberlain's family lineage may have made a military career a forgone conclusion. His father, Joshua Chamberlain, was a lieutenant colonel in the Maine Militia who "had 'a chivalrous strain of blood in his composition' and taught Chamberlain lessons of honor, courtesy, and magnanimity towards foes." 53 His grandfather was a colonel in the militia as well, and his greatgrandfather had served in the Revolutionary War. 54 Chamberlain was born as Lawrence Joshua, named in honor of Commodore James Lawrence, the famous ship captain that uttered the words "Don't give up the ship" in 1813. 55 In On a trip to Canada with his father in May 1853, Chamberlain found that he had a capacity to endure, if not enjoy, harsh conditions. Writing to his sister about his trip, he wrote:
"Positively, I do not think I ever suffered such pain in my life. But I was determined not to complain and to keep up with the others. Father was very careful and kind to me, but there was no help and I resolved to "grin and bear it" I've found meaning in that phrase I tell you particularly the grin. It was actually a relief to me when in crossing a furious river on some logs that were floating down, I got on one that was too small and sunk in-it felt so refreshing." 63 He said the same thing campaigning in Northern Virginia 9 years later, writing in a letter to Fannie that "We bivouac as we can--some taking more pains and some less. I take my saddle for a pillow--rubber talma for a bed--shawl for a covering and a big chestnut tree for a canopy and let it blow. A dashing rain and furious gale in the night make me put on a skull-cap (given me by the major) and pull the talma over my--head and all--curl up so as to bring myself into a bunch--and enjoy it hugely." 64 Chamberlain experienced Bowdoin as both a student and professor, graduating from a theological seminary in between. As a student, Chamberlain abstained from drinking and rarely engaged with his friends outside of class; his extracurricular activities consisted of church and the occasional visit to a professor's house for social gatherings. This did not stop him from gaining the respect of his peers, who cordially referred to him as "Jack." Although he refused to drink, he did not look down upon those who did. It was a personal choice to ensure academic focus, and he made it "without putting on superior airs. As a Bowdoin professor, Chamberlain honed his own intellectual capacity by sharpening the minds of his students. He would spend long hours developing new teaching methods in rhetoric, which combined writing, speech, and great literature. He provided personal attention to each student, encouraging good mental discipline, thought processes, and habits of mind. 67 He instituted a process of "rewriting," which involved an iterative process of drafts, feedback, and final revision, in order to get at the student's mind. Bull Run. The southern social system produced officers accustomed to command, and rank and file accustomed to obey. We want cool, self-reliant, self-controlling officers and disciplined, 
Adelbert Ames
Ames had been a drill instructor of volunteers before his combat experience at Bull Run.
Overall, his initial perception of volunteers and the Twentieth men was negative; to him, citizensoldiers would need a heavy dose of discipline and strict handling. 79 In reality, this was not an unreasonable assumption. Before Ames arrived at Camp Mason, his battlefield command experience was limited to artillery during which he organized small teams to handle numerous cannon with machine-like precision. 80 When he saw the Twentieth Maine, he called it "a hell of a regiment," because it was undisciplined and running the enterprise with town-meeting-like administration. 81 Ames would teach Chamberlain much, both through example and direct, oneon-one instruction.
At first glance at the memoirs, letters, and other original documents, it would appear that His Bull Run experience demonstrated the importance of discipline, and the Twentieth Maine had anything but when he took command in August 1862. 89 Subsequently, Ames tailored his leadership style to get the Twentieth ready for combat, one that emphasized endless drill, physical stamina, and strict discipline. 90 He also tailored his instruction to the Twentieth's skill level.
Step one was to ingrain the "School of the Soldier" into every man, so that they could perform the nine steps of muzzle loading automatically and reduce the risk of battlefield errors. 91 Step two was to teach Casey's Infantry Tactics, starting with rudimentary maneuvers first since he did not know how much time he would have until their next engagement. For example, he ignored moving from column to line and line back to column for later since it was overly complicated at the time. 92 They would eventually reach this level of skill, however, learning the process of complex line changes and maneuver which proved critical throughout the war. As early as Fredericksburg, the process of numbering odd and even men, remembering those numbers, and using them to execute movements in the "School of the Regiment" handbook proved reliable in many capacities. Ames and Chamberlain used it to perform an adhoc retrograde plan during their second night at Marye's Heights. The even-numbered men dug while the odd moved to the rear 100 yards and started digging, creating a leap-frog entrenchment system.
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At times, Ames may have gone too far. Between Antietam and Fredericksburg, he continued to drill his regiment harshly even though many were sick (some died) due to disease in an unsanitary bivouac. 94 But his style was required to solve a specific leadership problem: he had little time to get the Twentieth Maine ready for fierce modern combat. One manner to do this was to fortify bonds, discipline, and skill throughout the ranks by making them hate him. Pullen writes that "Their ability was growing at a rapid pace equal to their hatred for them. From the beginning he had been deliberately lashing them into a 'we'll show 'em' attitude." 95 And even some members of the Twentieth understood his approach. Thomas Chamberlain's letter home showed the unit's contempt, but in it he admitted that Ames was "bringing out the soldier in them." The relationships of the commanders within the V Corps, forged over a couple of years of hard-fighting, made the melee at Five Forks easy to deal with: Our commands were queerly mixed, men of every division of the corps came within my jurisdiction, and something like this was probably the case with several other commanders. But that made no difference; men and officers were good friends. There was no jealousy among us subordinate commanders. We had eaten salt together when we had not much else. This liveliness of mutual interest and support, I may remark, is sometimes of great importance in the developments of a battle.
program who briefed lessons-learned from the Peninsular Campaign, Second Bull Run, Antietam, and Fredericksburg. Like Chamberlain, Vincent was a product of a liberal arts education. Naturally, Chamberlain became very close with Vincent, who commanded the EightyThird Pennsylvania and then took command of the Third Brigade when Stockton retired.
These discussions, combined with his self-study and tutelage under Adelbert Ames, turned Chamberlain into a highly effective small-unit leader. His innovation and efficiency on and off the battlefield was remarkable. For example, he became adept in the manner in which he marched his troops to expedite forced marches and cut down on straggling. Wallace wrote that
Chamberlain had the knack of holding them together. He rested them frequently, and although he was often criticized for this procedure, it was presently noted that he always brought them in on time and in condition to fight. Nor did he waste their energy marching and countermarching to form camp. He would send an officer ahead to reconnoiter the ground, then, on the basis of the officer's report, he would decide the particular maneuver which would place the troops in the proper order for camp. His weary men never forgot such consideration. Round Top while "refusing" Oates' flanking maneuver. 112 The fact that the Twentieth Maine carried this out under fire from the Texans was a testament to their training and discipline. 113 Chamberlain was surprised out how well it was done under fire. 114 The wheeling maneuver ("like a swinging door on a gate post") started from
Chamberlain's simple "Bayonet" command, which was his solution to overwhelming force from
Oates and the Twentieth's diminishing ammunition. 115 Had the fight continued at its present intensity, the Twentieth would have lost by exhaustion. The "right wheel" was never an official order, according to numerous official reports and accounts of the battle. Even Chamberlain wrote in his official report: "I ordered the bayonet. The word was enough…" 116 Nesbitt writes that the wheeling effect may have occurred from Captain Ellis Spears' wing (left) having less resistance in enemy and terrain to deal with than the right wing (Chamberlain's). As a result, they were able to sweep down the hill faster and get ahead of the right wing. 117 Many speculate that the counterattack in general was the fruit of Chamberlain's study of Jomini: "Every army which maintains a strictly defensive attitude must, if attacked, be at last driven from its position; whilst by profiting by all the advantages of the defensive system, and holding itself ready to take the offensive when occasion offers, it may hope for the greatest success." 118 Jomini also wrote that "When the assailant, after suffering severely, finds himself strongly assailed at the moment when the victory seemed to be in his hands, the advantage will, in all probability, be his no longer, for the moral effect of such a counter-attack upon the part of an adversary supposed to be beaten is certainly enough to stagger the boldest troops." 119 In the end, Chamberlain's defense of Little Round Top was a textbook defense with an innovative twist.
As a brigade commander, Chamberlain showed hints of tactical adaptation that were not fully realized until World War I. Wallace points out that Chamberlain was not skeptical of long-distance bayonet charges, especially against fortified systems of defensive breast-works, because improved small arms technology would often cause heavy casualties to the attacking line.
Instead, he explained, Chamberlain would order "rifles on the shoulder" until his lines were within a sprint distance so that they could return volleys of fire until the bayonet made sense. He also directed "loose" formations, forcing the Confederates to spread out their defensive fires.
Wallace wrote that tactics such as these were not common until World War I technology made them mandatory to avoid catastrophic levels of casualties.
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Much like Ames' effect on the Twentieth Maine, Charles Griffin commanded a certain amount of respect from the First Division after taking command after Gettysburg. Before the review of the Army of the Potomac in 1865, the Fifth Corps officers put together a parting gift for Griffin: a diamond-studded pin with a Maltese Cross, the Fifth Corps emblem. 121 Chamberlain presented him the gift, saying "…a worthy token of the deep regard in which he was held in this division so honorably known as his in the last campaign, and with which he had been conspicuously associated since the heroic days of Fitz-John Porter." 122 Chamberlain's actions on Quaker Road, which was the key to Petersburg, were epic. But the engagement also caused him to reflect on Griffin's leadership. Having been knocked unconscious by a deflected minié ball, Chamberlain awoke just in time to check his retreating right flank. 123 For the most part, his brigade had broken and could have cost the First Division and Fifth Corps dearly. But Griffin had trust in his actions; he allowed Chamberlain to fight with his two regiments instead of bringing up reinforcements and held the Third Brigade in reserve. 124 Chamberlain felt that Griffin had purposely allowed him to finish the fight in order get proper recognition, a lesson he later drew upon. a correct definition of great generalship regards not so much the power to command resources, or the conditions of a grand theater of action, as the ability to handle successfully the forces available, be they small or great. And this, it will be seen, involves many qualities not readily thought of as military. Among these is economy in the expenditure of force. Another is foresight, the ability to count the cost beforehand and to discriminate between probabilities and possibilities,-prudence might be the word for this, did it not border on hesitation, which has wrecked some reputations, if it has made others. There is also astuteness, the ability to judge characters and the probable action of an adversary in given conditions. And we may add humanity, regard for the well-being of the men employed in military operations, which might come also under the head of economics.
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With that definition as a guiding concept, he analyzed Grant, saying that he "he was a strategist; he was not an economist. He saw what was to be done, and he set himself to do it, without being much controlled by consideration of cost or probabilities." A negative side-effect to this management style, albeit a necessary one to finish the war, was that "great cost of human life involved in a proposed plan was not taken into the reckoning beforehand; though regretted afterwards, it was not given weight in laying plans following." 134 While this may seem overly critical, Chamberlain realized that Grant's approach was effective. In many ways, much like Ames' strict discipline was required to harden the Twentieth Maine, Grant's bloody strategy of attrition brought the Army of Northern Virginia to its knees. In Chamberlain's words, Grant was necessary to bring that war to a close, whether by triumph of force or exhaustion of resources. His positive qualities, his power to wield force to the bitter end, must entitle him to rank high as a commanding general. His concentration of energies, inflexible purpose, unselfishness, patience, imperturbable long-suffering, his masterly reticence, ignoring either advice or criticism, his magnanimity in all relations, but more than all his infinite trust in the final triumph of his cause, set him apart and alone above others.
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In many ways, Chamberlain viewed Lee as a striking contrast to Grant. He felt Grant was a failure in resource economy while Lee excelled because he initially overcame war-making struggles in the Confederacy and become dominant. But Grant visualized and executed an effective strategy to exhaust Lee into submission. Lee failed to find a strategy that would make enough gains to realize the Confederacy's political goal. He wrote that Lee "exemplified remarkable ability as a commander. In military sagacity and astuteness we recognized his superiority. In singleness of purpose, and patient persistence, like our own great commander, he 
Conclusion
For the leader hoping to emulate Chamberlain, there is a lot to learn. Luckily, the plethora of literature about his life, much of it written by himself, offers a vast amount of insight to his leadership philosophy. Studying Chamberlain through the lens of the Army's modern-day leadership framework "BE-KNOW-DO," one might find that Chamberlain's thoughts on the Civil War, his actions as commander, and decisions were born from a mixture of personality, pre-service influences, and his on-the-job training in the Fifth Corps.
Chamberlain's pre-service experiences in childhood and at Bowdoin imprinted on him three tools that set the foundation for his mastery of military affairs: a strong work ethic, selfstudy habits that enabled a deep-level of understanding very quickly, and the ability to find solutions to novel, complex problems. His self-study habits, albeit hard to put into words, grew from a love of learning. His innovative approaches to teaching as professor of languages at Bowdoin demonstrated his desire to imprint this love of learning on his students. The best way to describe this skill set was to use Chamberlain's own words. He described his own language professor's attempts to help him "think through a thing, and think out." Furthermore, one must not forget that Chamberlain served as Maine Governor almost immediately following the war and had potential to become a U.S. Senator, indicating that Chamberlain serves as a leadership case study in spheres beyond the military. When Pullen said that much can be learned about leadership by studying Chamberlain's life in the army, he was correct. In fact, much could be learned about leadership by examining Chamberlain's entire life in depth from childhood onward.
